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A B S T R A C T
A moral hazard model is used to show why overly optimistic revenue forecasts prior to elections
can be optimal: Opportunistic governments can increase spending and appear more competent;
ex post deficits emerge in election years, thereby producing political forecast cycles – as also
found for US states in the empirical literature. Additionally, we obtain three theoretical results
which are tested with panel data for Portuguese municipalities. The extent of manipulations is
reduced when (i) the winning margin is expected to widen; (ii) the incumbent is not re-running;
and/or (iii) the share of informed voters (proxied by education) goes up.
1. Introduction
Since the Greek admission to have falsified its fiscal data on 22 September 2004 (Carassava, 2004) there has been a significant
increase in academic articles on forecast errors and forecast manipulation. For instance, Heinemann (2006) and Brück and Stephan
(2006) argue that forecast optimism may have increased in Germany and the eurozone, respectively, since the introduction of the
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Governments try to influence the international and domestic public’s perception of fiscal conditions.
Similarly, Gilbert and de Jong (2017) find that the European Commission’s (EC’s) fiscal forecasts for euro-area countries are too
optimistic when the budget deficit comes close to violating the critical value of 3% of GDP.
There is also evidence that governments use financial forecasts to expand their fiscal room for manoeuvre in election years in order
to increase their chances of re-election. Election year forecast optimism is confirmed, for instance, by Boylan (2008) who shows for
49 US states for the period from 1988 to 2004 that the state revenue growth forecast error is 2.2% higher in election years despite
constitutional balanced budget constraints. Further evidence of opportunistic manipulation of forecasts is found, for instance, by
Kauder et al. (2017) with respect to spending forecasts in election years by East German state governments; and by Boukari and
Veiga (2018) with respect to revenue and expenditure forecasts in French and Portuguese local authorities from 1998 to 2015. Pina
and Venes (2011) argue that upcoming elections induce over-optimism in the budget forecasts of Excessive-Deficit Procedure (EDP)
reports of European Union countries. Interestingly (and somewhat comparable to the aforementioned result by Gilbert and de Jong
(2017) on countries close to violating the SGP), Merola and Pérez (2013) find over-optimism in election years not just in forecasts
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by European governments, but also, though weaker, in forecasts for European countries by international organisations such as the
EC and the OECD.
This paper presents a political economy model that captures the idea of expanding the fiscal room for manoeuvre by using
overly optimistic forecasts. This is particularly relevant in the context of Portuguese municipalities which we use in the empirical
analysis. The room for manoeuvre for mayors is quite limited, so that forecast manipulation seems a good way for circumventing
this obstacle. The first objective of our paper is, therefore, to analyse and illustrate the underlying theoretical mechanism in a
setting with an opportunistic government and a partially uninformed electorate. The incumbent government can manipulate revenue
forecasts in order to be able to increase spending and, thereby expand its provision of public goods. This is a hidden effort because
uninformed voters cannot pinpoint the reason for the expansion; instead, they attribute it to government competence, thereby raising
the government’s re-election chances.1 At the same time, deficits must increase when revenue forecasts are too optimistic. Since
forecasts and budgets are larger in election years, we obtain political forecast and budget cycles. Not only do we offer a theoretical
mechanism that can explain the existence of forecast manipulation in election years found in the earlier empirical literature, but we
also provide additional evidence based on data from Portuguese municipalities for the period 1998–2017.
The second objective of our paper is to investigate the factors that are conducive to increasing the forecast manipulation even
further. In the theoretical model we obtain the following results. First, a larger ex ante expected winning margin allows the incumbent
to reduce its revenue forecast which leads to a lower level of costly indebtedness. Second, if the incumbent is not re-running, its
own interest in winning the elections is reduced. Again, the motivation for high indebtedness is reduced. Third, if there are more
uninformed voters, any manipulation is more effective. Hence the government will expand its effective tool and choose higher
revenue forecasts. These findings are supported by the empirical analysis. The expected winning margin is proxied by the previous
election winning margin. Uninformedness is captured by alternative education proxies. There is overwhelming evidence, both in the
main results and in a battery of robustness tests, in support of our theoretical predictions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the model and its solution and presents Propositions 1
to 3. Details are provided in the appendix. The empirical model is set out in Section 3 and the results are presented in Section 4.
Additional robustness tests can be found in the appendix. Section 5 concludes.
2. Political forecast cycle model
The model captures an incumbent government which has some leverage over its revenue forecasts. It can manipulate them in
order to expand its public services with the hope of convincing voters of being more competent and, thereby, increasing its re-election
chances. Voters can be informed or uninformed about the government forecasts. If they are informed they can use this information
to deduce government competence. If they are uninformed they have to form expectations. Overall, the model is of the Shi and
Svensson (2006) and Bohn (2018) type; it captures moral hazard of an opportunistic government thereby producing political cycles.
2.1. Preferences
Every alternate period two opportunistic politicians run for office, an incumbent a and a challenger b. Individual voter i’s utility




(𝛽 i)s−tEs[us(cs) + G+s + 𝛼𝜒
izs] with 𝜒 i = 𝜃i − 𝛾. (1)
The intertemporal utility function for any voter i comprises additively-separable utility from private consumption, us(cs), utility from
public consumption G+s , with unity marginal utility (a simplification also used by Shi and Svensson, 2006), and a non-economic
component 𝜒 izs, with relative weight 𝛼, in each period. Formally, discounting between periods is included here, but can be ignored
later on because it does not contribute to substance nor exposition as will be seen further down. Utility derived from sympathy
represents any attribute of the candidates that does not affect economic policies, be it their stance on societal issues or their good
looks. It reflects more or less strong sympathy for one of the two candidates. Without limiting the generality of the analysis we assume
that support for incumbent a is depicted by negative values of 𝜒 i, support for challenger b by positive values. Sympathy utility is




2 − 𝛾] since zt is either −
1
2 (when incumbent a is elected) or +
1
2 (when challenger b is elected); the
personal sympathy parameter 𝜃i is uniformly distributed over the interval [−1,1]; and 𝛾 is a shift parameter.2
Both politicians j = a, b face a utility function similar to the one for voters consisting, again, of an economic and, if the politician
is in power, a non-economic component. The non-economic component is, however, different and includes both a political rent and
1 Earlier theoretical moral hazard papers in which a government can appear more competent by manipulating a (partially) uninformed electorate are Lohmann
(1998) for political business cycles, and Shi and Svensson (2006) for political budget cycles. In Bohn (2019), the government uses its incumbency advantage to affect
the beliefs of the electorate.
2 If voter i has somewhat more sympathies for incumbent a, say at 𝜒 i = − 1
2
, then her utility derived from sympathy is positive ( 1
4




); but it is negative (− 1
4
), if challenger b is elected (zs =
1
2
). If 𝛾 = 0, incumbent and challenger have equal chances of being elected; with 𝛾 > 0, the
incumbent has higher chances.
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, j = a, b. (2)
Ir =
{
1 if in power in period r
0 otherwise
Both politicians are concerned about private and public consumption. In addition, politician a (in power) receives ego rent Xs and
bears reputation costs (𝜉sD2s−1), if she was also in power in the previous period. Reputation costs rise overproportionally (squared)
with the previous period deviation (Ds−1 > 0) from a balanced budget3 (Ds−1 = 0).4
For voters and politicians alike, period t consumption ct is modelled to depend upon trend output ȳ and any deviation of output
y+t . For simplification, the tax revenues (and expenditures) for trend output are not explicitly studied, but would not change the
analysis; note, however, that deadweight loss and distributional effects are ignored. What we do consider are tax revenue changes
caused by deviations of output, hence each agent’s additional net-of-tax income (1 − 𝜏)y+t in the consumption function5:




The deviation from trend output, y+t , is a random variable with mean Et[y
+
t ] = 0 and variance 𝜎2. For a constant tax rate, it can also
be expressed in terms of additional revenue the government receives, R+t , which is also a random variable with mean zero.
2.2. Fiscal policy and competence




forec − (1 + rt−1)(Dt−1) + 𝜂
j
t . (4)
We assume a planned balanced budget; see Footnote 3. However, by making overly optimistic revenue forecasts, R+t
forec, for random
variable R+t the incumbent can manipulate the amount of public goods she supplies to voters.
6 The variable R+t
forec is thus the
incumbent’s instrument7 and forms the basis for her budget calculations; previous period deficit Dt−1 including interest at exogenous
rate rt−1 must be repaid.
The amount of public goods any government j can supply also depends on j’s positive or negative competence shock, 𝜂jt . Compe-
tence could be interpreted, for instance, as tax collection efficiency or public goods provision efficiency. Competence 𝜂jt consists of a






Hence competence persistence is modelled as an MA(1) process.8
Each skills shock 𝜇jt is a random variable with mean 0, distribution function F(𝜇
j
t) = F(•) and density function f (𝜇
j
t) = f (•) = F′(•)
which is (weakly) monotonously increasing up to the mean.9 Past shocks are common knowledge, but current or future shocks are
unknown to both politicians and voters. Even the incumbent does not know her own current competence – an idea suggested by Shi
and Svensson (2006) – because she always faces new tasks and challenges (like the financial crisis or the European refugee crisis)
or wants to start new programmes and cannot foresee how efficiently she can manage them. Not knowing her own competence,
3 Most Portuguese municipalities exhibit a near-balanced budget; see page 14 in Section 3 and Table E.1 in Appendix E. Alternatively, deviations from a prespecified
deficit target D (i.e. Ds−1 > D) could also be modelled, but would produce the same qualitative results.
4 Leaving reputation costs out would not contradict any of the findings of this paper, but would require the inclusion of subjective discount rates and a careful
discussion of interest (debt repayment) versus discount rates. – The quadratic form is the simplest way of capturing how the government’s trustworthiness and
credibility are affected. The legislature and social groups the government has to deal with may “tolerate” small, but not large, deviations and dislike both surpluses
and deficits.
5 Note that we keep the tax rate 𝜏 constant because possibilities for tax rate changes by Portuguese municipalities are very limited and the tax revenue effect would
be very small. See page 15 in Section 3 (the paragraph on financial autonomy and its limitations as well as the paragraph thereafter).
6 The corresponding variable in the empirical model would be the deviation of the forecast from some moving average (MA) of the actual revenues of the previous
years. This is the variable we used originally. However, upon suggestions by referees and to be more in line with the standard in the literature, we now use forecast
errors. The results based on the MA forecast variable are reported as robustness checks in Table F.3 in Appendix F.
7 In the Portuguese setting, municipal forecasts comprise realistic expectations, mainly in current revenues (see page 15), as well as deliberate forecast manipulation,
mainly in capital revenues (such as success optimism for funding applications and promised sales of capital goods; see page 15).
8 Limited persistence is a compromise. It allows some persistence while acknowledging that competence also changes over time as new tasks for politicians emerge.
For persistence longer than 1 period, the model would not be easily solvable. Rogoff and Sibert (1988)’s and Rogoff (1990)’s suggestion of an MA(1) process is one of
two conditions (the other being the assumption of debt being costly) for splitting the model into separate 2-period cycles as is common in this literature. Each cycle
consists of an election period and an off-election period. The timing of events (page 7) and the role of these assumptions is outlined further down.
9 For more unusual density functions (for instance, with F′′(𝜇at ) < 0 for some 𝜇at ≤ 0), we could get ambiguous results. However, the limiting case of F′′(𝜇at ) = 0 for
some 𝜇at ≤ 0 or even over the entire range (uniform distribution) is acceptable.
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Table 1
The timing of events.
All voters and
incumbent a observe:
- last period’s deficit Dt−1




- additional public goods
G+t
Informed voters:




The winner of the period t elections takes office
and receives an ego rent.
If the incumbent stays in office, she suffers a
reputation loss for a period t budget deficit.
The winner repays the deficit of the previous year.
Incumbent a:















- form expectations of the incumbent’s
current period skills
𝜇at
(based on rational expectations of





Period t Period t + 1
any incumbent has an incentive to provide additional public goods in order to appear more competent and increase her re-election
chances. Since politicians do not have an informational advantage, there is no signalling, only moral hazard.
The government deficit is obtained residually because forecast revenues are committed according to Equation (4), but actual
revenues deviate; we can also determine the expected deficit given Eat [R
+
t ] = 0:
Dt ≡ R+t
forec − R+t ; (6)





Since the incumbent hopes to facilitate augmented public services in order to increase re-election chances, she accepts (and expects)
a positive deficit.
2.3. Timing of events
The timing of events is summarised in Table 1. In election period t, everybody observes last period’s deficit Dt−1 and past skills
shock 𝜇at−1. On this basis, incumbent a chooses her forecast of additional revenue R
+
t
forec, thus determining the amount of additional
public goods G+t it can provide according to Equation (4). All voting individuals observe G
+
t , but only informed voters can also
observe and make use of the state government’s policy choice of the forecast of additional revenue R+t
forec. They can, therefore,







Uninformed voters can only form expectations of the incumbent’s current skills, 𝜇at , based on their perception of the government
forecast of additional revenue,
̂
R+t
forec. Then all voters cast their votes based on their different information sets and their different
beliefs of 𝜇at . What matters is that a share of voters is uninformed, even though they are rational in the end. If government policy
could be correctly observed by all voters, the government would gain nothing from manipulating the forecast and from expanding
public goods.
In period (t + 1), the winner (incumbent or challenger) takes office and receives an ego rent. If the incumbent stays in office,
she also suffers a reputation loss amounting to disutility 𝜉tD2t−1 for not having achieved a balanced budget; a government found
to have cheated may be in a weaker position in negotiations with the legislature and social groups. However, voters are no longer
relevant for the politician’s decision making in (t + 1) because they cannot vote in period (t + 1). Politicians have no incentive
for manipulating their forecast of additional revenue R+t
forec. They want to repay the previous period deficit because the deficit is
costly10 and voters cannot sanction the politician for producing a negative amount of additional public goods, thereby financing
deficit repayment. Given that voters are only concerned about politicians’ competence after the election it does not matter that
voters anticipate in election period t that any politician will repay the deficit in the off-election period (t + 1). Note also that voters
do not consider expected utility in (t + 2) in their voting decision in t, because even informed voters cannot distinguish between the
incumbent and her challenger in (t + 2) (competence is an MA(1) process only). Politicians, too, are not concerned about the more
distant future, because they have no instrument for affecting utility or re-election chances in (t + 2). The model can, therefore, be
split in 2-period cycles consisting of an election period (period t) and an off-election period (period t + 1). See also Footnote 8.
10 Repayment is guaranteed for two reasons. Firstly, because of the aforementioned reputation loss. Secondly, technically, because the marginal utility of additional
deficit-financed public goods in t is 1 (if the subjective discount factor is set to 1 for simplicity), whereas its marginal cost and, therefore, the marginal disutility is
(1 + rt ), i.e. greater than 1. The unity marginal public goods utility assumption is also used by Shi and Svensson (2006).
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2.4. Incumbent’s probability of winning
The incumbent maximises her expected utility in t and t + 1 (whereby the discount rate can be set to 0 for simplicity). The (t + 1)
utility depends on the probability of the incumbent of winning the election. First, we must, therefore, determine the probability
that an individual agent votes for incumbent a. We assume prospective voting, i.e. voting depends on whether a voter expects the
incumbent or the challenger to deliver a higher level of utility after the elections, i.e. in t + 1. This depends on two components:
(i) on the voter’s sympathy 𝜒 i = 𝜃i − 𝛾 towards the candidates; and (ii) on who can deliver more public goods which, in turn,
depends on the politicians’ skills in periods t and t + 1. Agents do not know future skills of incumbent or challenger; nor can they
observe any skills of the challenger in period t. However, they may have expectations on the incumbent’s skills (Et[𝜇at ]) based on
her performance in office in period t. It is shown in Appendix A that an individual agent votes for incumbent a, if the following
inequality holds:
Et[𝜇at ] > 𝛼(𝜃
i − 𝛾). (8)
First, suppose shift parameter 𝛾 is zero, then ex ante incumbent and challenger have an equal chance of winning the election.
However, even if incumbent a is expected to be (slightly) less skilled than average, i.e. Et[𝜇at ] < 0, a voter will vote for incumbent a,
if the voter is sufficiently sympathetic towards the incumbent (remember that 𝜃i < 0 indicates sympathy for incumbent a and 𝛼 is
a positive weight). Conversely, even if a voter is sympathetic towards the challenger (𝜃i > 0), the incumbent could still be chosen,
if the incumbent is expected to exhibit sufficiently strong (above average) skills. Second, with shift parameter 𝛾 negative, it is easier
for the incumbent to convince voters to vote for her; it requires a lower level of expected skill, Et[𝜇at ] < 0.
On this basis, we derive (in the appendix) the probability for the incumbent to win the election:
Prob
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩

























The probability depends on whether informed voters (share (1 − 𝜓)) and uninformed voters (share 𝜓) think that the incumbent’s
skills are above average (Et[𝜇at ] > 0) or not. The difference for informed and uninformed voters occurs because informed voters
have all the information for deducing 𝜇at from the period t planned government budget constraint (4); uninformed voters do not.
Uninformed voters do not observe the forecast of additional revenue R+t








forec – as shown in Appendix B. On this basis, we can
derive the incumbent’s probability of winning Probwin:
Probwin = Prob
{











forec) − 𝛼𝛾], (11)
where F(•) is the distribution function of the skills shock. Note that this equation shows that, in equilibrium, the incumbent cannot
increase her winning probability by using forecast manipulations, if we assume rational expectations. For 𝛾 = 0, we obtain Probwin =
1 − F[0] = 12 in equilibrium.
2.5. Incumbent’s decision problem
To determine the governments policy choice, we maximise the incumbent’s expected utility over any 2-period cycle, i.e. period t
utility plus period (t + 1) utility in case of winning the election multiplied by the probability of winning (as determined in step 2)
plus period (t + 1) utility in case of losing multiplied by the probability of losing:
max
R+t
forec V = maxR+t





forec Eat { ut(y + (1 − 𝜏)
R+t
𝜏
) + G+t + Xt − 𝜉D
2
t−1 }
+ Eat { Prob
win [ut+1(y + (1 − 𝜏)
R+t+1
𝜏
) + G+t+1 + Xt+1 − 𝜉D
2
t ] }
+ Eat { (1 − Prob
win) [ut+1(y + (1 − 𝜏)
R+t+1
𝜏
) + G+t+1] }. (12)
See Appendix C for a more detailed exposition of Equation (12) and the following steps. The government’s optimal choice of its
forecast of additional revenue R+t
forec can be characterised by the first order condition (FOC) given that the second order condition
holds. Under rational expectations this becomes:
−rt + F′[−𝛼𝛾]𝜓[Xt+1 − 𝜉(R+t
forec)2] − [1 − F[−𝛼𝛾]]2𝜉R+t
forec = 0. (13)
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The first term of rational expectations condition (13), −rt , is the marginal direct effect of the government’s forecast of additional
revenue on the deficit, which is negative because deficit including repayment is costly. The (additional) revenue forecast is optimally
chosen by the government, when the marginal direct effect on the deficit (first term) equals the net effect on the expected return
if the incumbent stays in power (second and third terms). The latter consists of countervailing effects. The second term depicts the
positive marginal impact of higher forecasts on the perceived skills of the incumbent and thus on the voting probability of receiving
the (given) expected net return (Xt+1 − 𝜉[R+t
forec]2). The third term captures the negative marginal impact of increased forecasts on
the punishment for the lost reputation (since the deficit will be increasing) given the chance of winning the elections.
Rational expectations condition (13) states that the government wants to increase its forecast of additional revenue until the
marginal deficit cost together with the punishment effect (which is very small for low levels of forecast manipulation) exceeds the
marginal benefit from spending on public goods which translates into a marginal benefit from increasing the chances of winning.
In other words, the first key result of the paper is that there are political forecast cycles; forecasts are increased in election years.
This also implies higher deficits which are repaid in off-election years. Hence, there is also a political budget cycle along the lines
of Shi and Svensson (2006); there is moral hazard because a hidden effort (deficit in Shi and Svensson; and forecasts here) is used
by the government for expanding public goods and trying to improve re-election chances. Overall, the theoretical part of the paper
pinpoints and illustrates the mechanism underlying the forecast manipulation found empirically by Boylan (2008) and others. This
was the first objective of the paper (together with providing additional empirical evidence of such manipulation).
Let us now turn to the second objective: How is the government’s optimal choice of its forecast manipulation affected by exogenous
aspects of the model? In particular, we would like to know the effect of an increased winning margin (captured by a higher shift
parameter 𝛾; see Proposition 1), the consequences of an incumbent who is not re-running (embodied by a lower ego rent for the time
after the elections, Xt+1; see Proposition 2), and the effect of increasing the share of uninformed voters (higher 𝜓 ; see Proposition 3).
2.6. Three testable propositions
Proposition 1. - The Winning Margin.





Proof. See Appendix D.
A larger winning margin allows the government to avoid costly deficits both in terms of repayment and reputation costs.
Proposition 2. - When the Incumbent is not Re-running.





Proof. See Appendix D.
If the incumbent does not benefit from winning so much any more, winning becomes less important. No longer does it pay to
incur high deficit repayment and reputation costs.
Proposition 3. - The Share of Uninformed Voters.





Proof. See Appendix D.
Manipulation works because uninformed voters can be tricked. If more of them can be cheated, the manipulation instrument
becomes more effective. Hence it is used more.
3. Data, setting, and empirical models
This section has three purposes. First, it describes the data and the institutional setting for Portuguese municipalities. Second,
it introduces the empirical baseline model that is used for confirming the forecast manipulation result obtained in our theoretical
model and in the existing empirical literature. Third, it presents the changes to the baseline model which are needed for testing the
implications (propositions) derived from our theoretical model at the end of Section 2.
3.1. Data and institutional setting
Detailed fiscal data for the 308 municipalities was obtained from the Directorate General of Local Authorities (DGAL), information
regarding the dates and results of local elections and on mayors’ characteristics from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MAI), and
6
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demographic and economic data from the National Statistics Institute (INE) and from Marktest’s Sales Index database. Our dataset
covers the period from 1998 to 2017, for which DGAL’s data on municipal initial budgets is available. Five local elections took place
during our sample period (2001, 2005, 2009, 2013, and 2017).
Municipalities are the highest subnational government level in mainland Portugal, and the second in the autonomous regions of
Azores and Madeira, which have regional governments. All municipalities are subject to the same laws and regulations, have the
same responsibilities for public service provision,11 and have the same institutional structure. Regarding the latter, the Town Council
(Câmara Municipal) holds the executive power, while the Municipal Assembly holds the deliberative power, approving, among other
things, the municipal budgets and plans of activities. Voters elect the members of both chambers directly, by casting their votes on
closed party or independent lists of candidates. The top candidate of the most voted list for the Town Council becomes the mayor,
presides that chamber and plays a leading role in the executive, having substantial power and latitude. Municipal elections are held
every four years, in all municipalities at the same time, generally in October (they were held in December until 2001). Although
other elections sometimes occurred in the same year, national, regional, or European elections were never concurrent with municipal
elections.
Local governments have financial autonomy, not needing approval from a higher-ranked authority to elaborate and approve their
own budgets and final accounts. Nevertheless, most of them heavily depend on grants from the central government or from the
European Union (own revenues account, on average, for less than one third of effective total revenues).12 The municipal budget is
drafted by the mayor’s team, analysed by the Town Council, and approved by the Municipal Assembly, in the last quarter of the year
prior to the relevant fiscal year (which corresponds to the calendar year). Forecasted municipal budgets must balance. Nonetheless,
municipalities are allowed to run operational budget deficits,13 which are, however, constrained by strict legal limits to the stock of
municipal debt.
Current revenues account for about two thirds of total municipal revenues (see Table E.1 in Appendix E). They are mainly
composed of current transfers (mostly central government grants) and by direct taxes (mostly on property). Central government
current grants are essentially formula-determined, and are included in the central government’s budget, which is published before
municipalities approve their own budgets. Municipalities can change property tax rates, but only within relatively narrow legal
limits. Since the tax base is quite stable, property tax revenues are relatively easy to forecast. Given the above, current revenues may
change (for instance, in response to increased output), but there is not much room for opportunistic forecast manipulation in current
revenues.
Capital revenues account for about a third of total revenues, and are mainly composed of capital transfers from the central
government and from the European Union (they represent about 95% of effective capital revenues). On average, about 40% of
capital grants are formula-determined, while the remaining 60% are contingent on the approval of applications for funding. This
makes capital transfers harder to predict and more prone to opportunistic forecast manipulation, as mayors can easily increase
forecasted revenues by being excessively optimistic about the approval of their applications for funding. The sales of capital goods
are also prone to opportunistic forecasting, as mayors can easily inflate forecasted revenues from the sale of municipal property.14
Given the uncertainty and the greater room for opportunistic forecast manipulation in capital revenues, it is not surprising that
average forecast errors15 (see the first three rows of Table E.2 in Appendix E) are much higher for effective capital revenues (440
euros per capita) than for current revenues (94 euros per capita). Additionally, average forecast errors in effective capital revenues
are higher in election years than in off-election years (see Table E.3), while the opposite is true for forecast errors in total current
revenues. Overall, revenue forecasts of Portuguese municipalities are biased upwards, and total and capital revenue forecasts seem
to be especially optimistic in election years. It is also worth noting that financial liabilities (loans) are the only revenue item which
is underpredicted in election years. This is a consequence of excessive optimism in effective total revenue forecasts, which leads to
budget deficits that have to be funded with loans. Thus, actual loans in election years are higher than forecasted.
Our theoretical model indicates that, by forecasting overly optimistic revenues, opportunistic governments can increase spending
to appear more competent prior to elections. This results in deficits in election years. The behaviour of forecasted revenues and of
actual expenditures and budget balances, illustrated in Fig. 1, appear to be consistent with the model’s predictions. Average forecast
errors in effective total and capital revenues and actual total expenditures tend to increase in election years relative to the previous
years of the electoral cycle (except in 2013), and budget balances tend to be lower (or deficits tend to be higher) in election years
than in off-election years.16
11 Distribution of water, sewage, basic schooling, local health care, social housing, local transportation and communication, property maintenance, promotion of
culture and science, recreation and sports facilities, environmental protection, and municipal policing.
12 Table E.1 in Appendix E presents descriptive statistics for the main revenue items, in real euros per capita. Descriptive statistics for total, current and capital
expenditures, and for budget balances, are also reported.
13 The operational budget balance corresponds to the difference between total revenues and total expenditures, excluding revenues and expenditures related to
financial assets and liabilities. Thus, if forecasted effective total revenues are below forecasted expenditures, the municipality will balance the budget with revenues
from financial liabilities (loans).
14 This was common practice by many Portuguese municipalities, which inflated their revenues by predicting to sell municipal property. In many cases, the sales
did not materialize, or the predicted sale prices were unrealistically high.
15 Forecast errors in revenues correspond to the difference between forecasted and actual amounts, both measured in real euros per capita (at 2017 national prices).
16 Descriptive statistics of expenditures and budget balances in election and off-election years are reported in Table E.4 in Appendix E. As illustrated in Fig. 1, mean
expenditures are higher in election years than in off-election years. Regarding average budget balances, there are deficits in election years and surpluses in off-election
years.
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Fig. 1. Averages of effective total revenue forecast errors, expenditures and budget balances.
3.2. Empirical models
The theoretical model’s first main result is that there are political forecast cycles. Revenue forecasts are more optimistic in election
years (see discussion of rational expectations FOC 13 in Section 2). Thus, larger forecast errors are expected in election years than in
off-election years. Despite the fact that descriptive statistics and Fig. 1 seem to support these theoretical predictions, it is necessary
to test them rigorously with an empirical model that controls for the main determinants of revenue forecast errors. Our baseline
empirical model is, therefore:
Rferrori,t = 𝛼 + 𝛽ElYi,t + X
′
i,t𝜃 + 𝜈i + 𝜎t + 𝜉i,t , (14)
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where Rferrori,t is the forecast error in revenues for municipality i in year t (forecasts taken from the initial municipal budget), in real
euros per capita (at 2017 national prices)17; ElYi,t is a dummy variable for the election year; Xi,t is a vector of control variables which
may affect forecasted revenues; 𝜈i represents unobserved municipality-specific effects; 𝜎t represents time-specific effects18; and 𝜉i,t
is the error term. 𝛼 and 𝛽 are scalar coefficients, and 𝜃 is a vector of coefficients to be estimated.
Since elections are held in all municipalities at the same time, the coefficient for the election-year dummy (𝛽) is not well-
identified, as it captures not only the effects of elections, but also the effects of other shocks, economic conditions, political events,
etc., which occurred in election years.19 This problem is mitigated by the fact that our sample covers five elections, and because our
empirical model includes a wide set of control variables which capture the effects of economic and political shocks and conditions,
and a set of mandate dummies to control for time effects.20 Thus, although common shocks which occurred in specific election years
may slightly affect the size of the estimated coefficient of the election-year dummy, its sign and statistical significance still provide
valid indications for the presence of political forecast and budget cycles.
Based on the theoretical model, on previous empirical evidence of forecast manipulations (for instance, Brück and Stephan, 2006;
Boylan, 2008; Bischoff and Gohout, 2010; Boukari and Veiga, 2018; Pina and Venes, 2011), and on political budget cycles found
for Portuguese municipalities (Veiga and Veiga, 2007; Aidt et al., 2011), we expect a positive 𝛽 in Equation (14). This means more
optimistic forecasts in election years which, in turn, allow for greater expenditure, and result in greater deficits.
The vector Xi,t includes a set of political variables which may affect the degree of manipulation of revenue forecasts: a dummy
variable for left-wing mayors, MayorLeft, as there may be an ideological bias in forecasts (Chatagny, 2015; Jochimsen and Lehmann,
2017); a dummy variable, Majority, which takes the value of one when the mayor is supported by majorities in both the Town
Council and the Municipal Assembly, and zero otherwise, to control for political fragmentation (Jochimsen and Lehmann, 2017);
the win-margin of the mayor’s party in the previous election, WinMargin, as a proxy for how close the election is expected to be; a
dummy variable, RunReelect, for mayors who run for reelection; and a dummy, SameParty, for when the mayor belongs to the main
national government party.
Also included in vector Xi,t are a set of socio-economic variables that may affect revenue forecasts: the forecast error in regional
(NUTS III)21 GDP growth,22 FErrorGDP, which controls for the effects of growth surprises (Pina and Venes, 2011; Buettner and
Kauder, 2015); the municipal unemployment rate, Unemp, as an indicator of economic performance (Chatagny and Soguel, 2012;
Jochimsen and Lehmann, 2017); the rate of population growth, PopGrowth; a proxy for municipal financial autonomy, FinAuton,
which corresponds to own revenues as a percentage of effective total revenues (Boukari and Veiga, 2018); and, the percentage of the
municipal population aged 15 or above with no formal education completed, %NoEduc. Except for the forecast error in regional GDP
growth, all economic, demographic and education control variables are lagged one year, since their values for year t are not known
at the time the revenue forecast for year t is made.
To test the propositions of the theoretical model, the empirical baseline model (14) is extended to check for interaction effects
with political or educational variables. The following extension for political variables is used for testing Propositions 1 and 2:
Rferrori,t = 𝛼 + 𝛽ElYi,t + 𝛾Poli,t + 𝛿(ElYi,t ∗ Poli,t) + X
′
i,t𝜃 + 𝜈i + 𝜎t + 𝜉i,t , (15)
where Poli,t is a political variable for municipality i in year t, and the remaining variables are as described above. The political
variables of interest include the margin of victory in the previous election, a dummy for when the mayor runs for reelection, and
dummies for left-wing mayors, for majority governments, and for incumbent party similarity with the national government.
The extension of baseline model (14) to include educational interaction terms replaces the political variable Poli,t in Equation (15)
by education variable Educi,t . It is used for testing Proposition 3 according to which electoral opportunism is greater in municipalities
17 Chatagny and Soguel (2012) define budgeting errors as Error = Rbudgeted−Ractual
Population
. Dividing the error by the cantonal population assures comparability across Swiss
cantons of very different sizes. We build on this definition, further dividing the forecast errors by the national consumer price index (using 2017 as the base year) in
order to make errors comparable across time. – As shown in robustness tests (see Table F.3 in Appendix F), the empirical results are practically the same when we
use as dependent variable percentage forecast errors; or the difference between forecasted and average past revenues (the latter being closer to our theoretical R+t
forec
variable; see Footnote 6).
18 Since the election-year dummy would be collinear with yearly dummy variables, we control for time effects using 4-year mandate dummies (for the periods
1998–2001, 2002–2005, …, 2014–2017).
19 We know that it is possible to separate the effects of the election year from those of common shocks when municipal elections are staggered over different years
(see Sjahrir et al., 2013; Repetto, 2018), as the election-year dummy can be included along with year dummies in the empirical model. However, this identification
advantage of staggered over simultaneous elections only holds under two conditions: (i) municipalities with elections in the same year hold the elections at the same
time of the year; and (ii) the timing of elections is essentially the same across different years. If these conditions are not met, elections may not be comparable in
terms of budget information available to voters, political or weather conditions, etc.
20 If our sample covered only one election, the effect of the election year would be insufficiently identified. But, with five elections, the estimated coefficient for
the election-year dummy variable is much less likely to be driven by common macroeconomic shocks, as the national business cycle is not synchronized with the
municipal election cycle (Portugal had positive national GDP growth in 2001, 2005, and 2017, and recessions in 2009 and 2013).
21 NUTS is the European Union nomenclature for territorial statistical units. Portugal is subdivided into three NUTS I regions (Mainland, Azores and Madeira), seven
NUTS II regions, and 25 NUTS III regions. Each NUTS III region aggregates several municipalities, which correspond to the NUTS IV level. There is no GDP data at
the municipal (NUTS IV) level.
22 The forecast error in regional GDP growth for municipality i in year t is defined as the difference between the forecasted and the actual growth rate for year t in the
NUTS III region that municipality i belongs to. Since regional GDP forecasts are not available, we obtained one-year ahead forecasts as in Bohn and Veiga (2019a,b),
estimating an ARMAX(2,1) model for the NUTS III GDP growth rates, employing the government’s national GDP growth forecast as an explanatory variable.
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Table 2
PBCs in effective revenue forecasts - baseline results.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)

































































































Observations 5375 5375 5375
Municipalities 308 308 308
Adjusted R-squared 0.19 0.09 0.21
Notes: Fixed effects regressions with standard errors clustered by municipality and robust to heteroskedasticity. The dependent vari-
able is the forecast error (forecast - actual) in effective revenues, in real euros per capita. T-statistics are in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01,
∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10.
with higher shares of uninformed voters (see also Shi and Svensson, 2006). Here is the modified model:
Rferrori,t = 𝛼 + 𝛽ElYi,t + 𝛾Educi,t + 𝛿(ElYi,t ∗ Educi,t ) + X
′
i,t𝜃 + 𝜈i + 𝜎t + 𝜉i,t , (16)
where Educi,t is a proxy for the education level of the population of municipality i in year t, and the remaining variables are
as described above. The models presented above are estimated for effective total revenues (total revenues excluding loans), current
revenues, and capital revenues (excluding loans), by fixed effects, with standard errors clustered by municipality. Descriptive statistics
of the variables used in this paper are presented in Appendix E (Table E.2).
4. Empirical results
Here, we present the results of the empirical analysis, which tests the main predictions of the theoretical model; we also discuss
an array of robustness tests.
4.1. Baseline model: political forecast cycles
The results of the estimation of the baseline model of Equation (14) for forecast errors in revenues (in real euros per capita), by
OLS with fixed effects and standard errors clustered by municipality (to account for autocorrelation in forecast errors) are reported
in Table 2. Consistent with our model’s first main theoretical result embodied in the discussion of the rational expectations condition
(13), there is evidence of more optimistic forecasts of effective total revenues (total revenues excluding loans) in election years. In
Column 1, the dummy variable for the election year is positive and highly statistically significant, with the forecast error in effective
total revenues increasing by 69.9 euros per capita in an election year when compared to off-election years. Since it is not possible
to completely separate the election-year effect from year effects, the estimated increase of 69.9 euros per capita should be taken as
merely indicative. But, since its bias is expected to be small, the true effect is surely positive and consistent with the existence of
10
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Table 3
Interactions with political variables.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)



























































































Observations 5375 5375 5375
Municipalities 308 308 308
Notes: Fixed effects regressions with standard errors clustered by municipality and robust to heteroskedasticity. The dependent
variable is the forecast error (forecast - actual) in effective revenues, in real euros per capita. All regressions include the full
set of control variables of Table 2. T-statistics are in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
political forecast cycles.23
Forecast errors in current revenues do not seem to change significantly in election years (Column 2). The lack of opportunism in
current revenue forecasts may be due to the fact that, for the vast majority of municipalities, central government formula-determined
grants account for most of the current revenues. As already mentioned in the previous section, since the amounts to be transferred
are announced before municipalities elaborate their budgets, there is not much room for forecast manipulation in current revenues.
Although some capital grants are also formula-determined, a significant part of government and European capital transfers are
based on project approval. Additionally, the sales of capital assets such as municipal buildings can in some years account for a
large share of capital revenues. Since voters cannot easily obtain reliable information on these capital revenue items, the margin of
manoeuvre for opportunistic forecasting is considerably larger for capital than for current revenues. This is consistent with the results
reported in Column 3, where the election year dummy variable is positive and highly statistically significant, suggesting that forecast
errors in effective capital revenues increase by 70.8 euros per capita in election years, relative to off-election years. The political
forecast cycles found for effective total revenues in Column 1 seem to be mainly driven by cycles in capital revenue forecasts.24,25
23 Irrespective of the “true” magnitude of the election-year effect being 69.9 euros per capita or 50 euros or even 90 euros, the conclusion is still that there are
PBCs in revenue forecasts. What really matters is that the estimated effect is clearly positive and statistically significant in the main estimations and in a battery of
robustness checks.
24 When dummies for the pre- and post-election years are also included (see Table F.1 in Appendix F), the former is statistically significant for total revenues and
both are significant for capital revenues, but their estimated coefficients are considerably smaller than those for the election year. Thus, the results provide further
support for the hypothesis that forecast errors are higher in election years than in off-election years.
25 In the estimations of Table 2, we control for time using 4-year mandate dummies, as year dummies would be collinear with the election-year dummy. In the
robustness tests reported in Table F.2, we estimate the model with year dummies (and excluded the election-year dummy). Since the coefficients for the year
dummies corresponding to election years are on average 60.49 euros per capita higher than those of off-election years, these results further support the hypothesis of
opportunistic manipulation of forecasts in election years.
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Fig. 2. Effects of the Win-Margin on the Average Marginal Effects of the Election Year (vertical axis reports the revenue forecast error in real euros (of 2017) per
capita).
Consider the effects of our control variables. First, we look at the role of political variables when they are not interacted with
the election year (as done in the next subsection). There is weak evidence that left-wing mayors are less opportunistic, but the other
political variables do not seem to directly affect forecast errors. Second, let us look at economic and other control variables. Errors
in regional GDP growth forecasts seem to play no role. However, as expected, better economic performance (lower unemployment
rates) leads to more optimistic forecasts. The same applies to higher rates of population growth. Financial autonomy seems to be
relatively unimportant, as it is only marginally statistically significant for effective capital revenues. A higher budget balance (or
a smaller deficit) in the previous year leads to lower forecast errors. Finally, a less educated municipal population seems to be
associated with more optimistic forecasts.
4.2. Interactions with political variables
Although most of the political variables do not seem to have direct effects on revenue forecast errors, it is possible that, as
predicted by the theoretical model, they affect the magnitude of the opportunistic manipulation of forecasts. To account for this
possibility, we estimate the model of Equation (15), which interacts the election-year dummy with several political variables. The
results are reported in Table 3. To economize on space, we only report the results for the coefficients of the election-year dummy,
for the political variable of interest, and for the interaction term.
In the first set of estimations, we interact the election-year dummy with the win-margin of the mayor’s party over the main
opposition party in the previous elections. In the absence of data on voting intentions for most municipalities, the margin of victory
in the previous election is our proxy for how close mayors expect the next elections to be.26 As expected and consistent with
Proposition 1, larger win-margins are associated with less optimistic forecasts for effective total and capital revenues. Fig. 2 shows
the average marginal effects of the election year, over the values of the win-margin (we omit values above 50%, which account for
1% of the cases. The marginal effects are decreasing, and become insignificant for win-margins of 40 percentage points or higher.
That is, mayors may not feel the need to behave opportunistically when they won the last elections by a very large margin.
The second set of estimation results corroborates our Proposition 2 which claims that a reduced ego rent leads to less opportunistic
behaviour. Obviously, forecast cycles should vanish if the ego rent were to go away completely. As a proxy, we use a dummy for
not running again. Our estimation results do, indeed, suggest that opportunistic (and optimistic) effective total and capital revenue
forecasts happen only, when the mayor runs for reelection. This is also consistent with the results of Veiga and Veiga (2007), who
found that opportunism in actual capital and total expenditures is greater when the incumbent mayor runs for reelection than when
her party has a different candidate.
Regarding the other estimations which test for interaction effects of other political control variables, there is no robust indication
that the ideology of the mayor, the support of majorities in both the Town Council and Municipal Assembly, or party similarity
26 The correlation between the win-margins of the current and of the previous elections is 0.44. The win-margin of the previous election is also highly statistically
significant in a probit model for the probability of reelection (results available upon request).
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Table 4
Education and the magnitude of election-year opportunism.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)























































Observations 5375 5375 5375
Municipalities 308 308 308
Notes: Fixed effects regressions with standard errors clustered by municipality and robust to heteroskedasticity. The dependent variable is the
forecast error (forecast - actual) in effective revenues, in real euros per capita. All regressions include the full set of control variables of Table 2.
T-statistics are in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
between the mayor and the prime minister affect the magnitude of the opportunistic management of revenue forecasts.
4.3. Effects of Education on the magnitude of PBCs
The estimation of the model of Equation (16) tests Proposition 3 on the effect of uninformed voters by interacting the election-
year dummy with several proxies of the education level of the municipal population of at least 15 years of age (since there is no
data on population above 18). The results are reported in Table 4. To economize on space, again, we only report the coefficients
for the election year, the education proxy, and its interaction. Three variables representing the education level of the municipal
population are used: the percentage of the population with no formal education level completed; the percentage of the population
with incomplete secondary education; and the percentage of the population with at least completed secondary education.
Regardless of the education proxy used, the results of Table 4 clearly support Proposition 3, indicating that lower education levels
are associated with more optimistic revenue forecasts in election years. This is also consistent with the model of Shi and Svensson
(2006), according to which opportunism is greater when there is a higher percentage of uninformed voters. Since the coefficients
of interactions with continuous variables are sometimes difficult to interpret, we illustrate them in Fig. 3, for the first and third
education proxies.
As can be seen in the graphs on the left hand side, the marginal effect of the election year becomes positive for effective total and
capital revenues when the percentage of the population at least 15 years of age which did not complete any formal education level
is close to or above 10 percent. On the right-hand-side graphs, we see that lower shares of the population with completed secondary
education are associated with higher marginal effects of the election year, that is, with greater opportunism.
4.4. Robustness tests
The robustness of our empirical results is checked in several ways.27 First, as mentioned above, we include dummies for the
pre- and post-election years in the baseline model of Equation (14). The results are reported in Table F.1 in Appendix F. Although
the estimated coefficient for the dummy of the pre-election years is statistically significant for effective total revenues, and the
coefficients of pre- and post-election dummies are statistically significant for capital revenues, they are considerably smaller than
the coefficient of the election-year dummy (Wald tests reject the equality of the coefficients). Thus, the results clearly indicate that
the highest forecast errors are obtained in elections years, which reinforces the results reported in Table 2, and supports our model’s
main result.
27 The robustness tests’ results, reported in Appendix F, are shown in tables only. Nevertheless, the respective figures are similar to those shown above; they are
available from the authors upon request.
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Fig. 3. Effects of Education on the Average Marginal Effects of the Election Year (vertical axis reports the revenue forecast error in real euros per capita).
Second, we control for time effects using year dummy variables, instead of 4-year mandate dummies. This change has the
drawback of forcing the exclusion of the dummy variable for the election year, but has the advantage of accounting for other events
that may have happened in specific election years. It is thus an alternative specification, thereby mitigating the identification problem
mentioned above. As shown in Table F.2, the estimated coefficients of the dummies which correspond to election years are higher
than the coefficients of the previous three years of the electoral cycle (the only exception is 2013). At the bottom of the table,
we report the average effects in election and non-election years, with the former always being higher than the latter. In fact, the
difference in the averages is statistically significant for effective total and capital revenues, with a positive sign, providing additional
support for the results shown in Table 2 and F.1 and for the hypothesis that there are Political Budget Cycles in revenue forecasts.28
Third, we use two alternative definitions of the dependent variable: (1) the percentage forecast error, that is, the ratio between
the forecasted and the actual revenues for year t; and (2), the difference between the forecasted revenues for year t and the average
revenues of the last four years. The results of these robustness checks, reported in Table F.3, are very similar to those of Tables 2–4,
providing further support for our theoretical model’s main result and for the three propositions.
Fourth, we check if the results are sensitive to two sample restrictions: (1) excluding the 30 municipalities of the archipelagos of
Azores and Madeira, as they have regional governments; and (2), excluding term-limited mayors from the sample (term limits only
became binding in the 2013 elections), as they have smaller incentives to behave opportunistically in election years. The results,
28 The estimated coefficients for two post-election year dummies, 2006 and 2010, are larger than for the election years of 2005 and 2009, respectively. Despite
these deviations from what would be expected in the presence of PBCs, the average of the coefficients for the election years is significantly higher than that for the
post-election years. Thus, on average, our results are clearly consistent with political budget cycles in revenue forecasts.
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reported in Table F.4, are very similar to those of the main tables when we use a sample with just mainland municipalities. When
term-limited mayors are excluded, there is no longer evidence that the win-margin and running for reelection affect the degree of
opportunism.
Fifth, we test our three propositions at the same time, rather than in separate regressions. That is, the three interactions with the
dummy variable for the election year were included simultaneously in the list of explanatory variables. In fact, we do this for two
different education proxies. As shown in Table F.5, the results again support all three propositions, indicating that it does not matter
whether we test them separately or jointly.
Finally, since our theoretical model indicates that political forecast cycles are associated with cycles in expenditures and deficits,
we present in Table F.6 the results of estimations for total, current and capital expenditures, and for the overal and the primary
budget balances. Consistent with our model, and with the results of previous studies for Portugal (Aidt et al., 2011; Veiga and Veiga,
2007), expenditures are higher and budget balances are lower in election years than in off-election years, providing clear indication
of political budget cycles.
5. Conclusion
This paper presents a political economy model which is consistent with the evidence (for instance, Boylan (2008); Heinemann
(2006); Boukari and Veiga (2018)) indicating that governments use overly optimistic revenue forecasts to expand their fiscal room
for manoeuvre in election years in order to increase their chances of re-election. Besides offering a theoretical mechanism which
can explain the results found in the aforementioned studies, this paper also investigates the factors that affect the magnitude of the
forecast manipulation. The three propositions derived from the model indicate that: (1) a larger ex ante expected winning margin
allows the incumbent to reduce its revenue forecast; (2) when the incumbent government is not running, its own interest in winning
the elections is reduced, and so is the opportunistic manipulation; and, (3) if there are more uninformed voters, any manipulation is
more effective.
These theoretical findings are supported by an empirical analysis based on data from Portuguese municipalities for the period
1998–2017. In fact, we find empirical evidence supporting our theoretical predictions; a battery of supporting robustness tests are
also presented. Even though the election-year effect may not be perfectly identified, as all municipalities hold elections at the same
time, our results clearly suggest that there is revenue forecast manipulation in election years and that the manipulation is smaller for
a higher win margin at the previous elections (our proxy for the expected win margin), when the incumbent mayor does not run for
re-election, and for a lower education level of the municipal population (our proxy for the percentage of uninformed voters).
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Appendix
The appendix presents indications for the model solution and the derivation of the propositions in Section 2. It also presents
descriptive statistics and additional empirical results.
A. Probability of individual agent to vote for the incumbent








exp. utility when a in power
≥ Et[ut+1(cbt+1) + G
+
t+1




exp. utility when b in power
. (A.1)
Depending on who is in power in (t + 1), the additional provision of public goods in Equation (A.1) will typically differ because of
differences in politicians’ competence and voters’ expectations thereof:
Et[G+t+1
j] = −Et[(1 + rt)Dt] + Et[𝜂
j
t+1], j = a, b. (A.2)
The equation says that the period t deficit must be repaid in period (t + 1). However, the politician will be expected not to borrow
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in period (t + 1) because there is no election at the end of that period.29 The best revenue forecast for the incumbent in (t + 1) is,
therefore, (R+t+1
forec)j = Et[(R+t+1)
j] = 0. Overall, there are probably no additional public goods in (t + 1); instead public goods are
likely to be reduced corresponding to deficit repayment modulo the effect of the politician’s competence. Agents have no idea about
the skills shock of either potential politician in t + 1. Nor do they know the skills shock of the challenger in period t, and, therefore,
expect 0. However, they can use the incumbent’s period t public goods provision policy to draw conclusions about her period t skills
shock, 𝜇at . (How this is done is not shown here, but further down; the difference between informed and uninformed voters will then
be exploited.)
Et[G+t+1
b] = −Et[(1 + rt)Dt]; (A.3)
Et[G+t+1
a] = −Et[(1 + rt)Dt] + Et[𝜇at ]; (A.4)
Since overestimation of additional revenue has no effect in an off-election year, private consumption in Equation (A.1) is the same




Combining Equations (A.1) and (A.3) to (A.5) we can obtain a condition for an individual to vote for incumbent a (which corresponds
to Condition (8) in the main text):
Et[𝜇at ] ≥ 𝛼(𝜃
i − 𝛾). (A.6)
Using the distribution of the skills shock we can determine the probability (Pr) of any voter, be she informed or uninformed, to vote
for incumbent a:
Pr[Et[𝜇at ] − 𝛼(𝜃
i − 𝛾) ≥ 0] =
Et[𝜇at ] − 𝛼(−1− 𝛾)
𝛼(1− 𝛾) − 𝛼(−1 − 𝛾) =
Et[𝜇at ]
2𝛼
+ 1 + 𝛾
2
. (A.7)
B. Probability of incumbent to win
Now, we can determine the probability Prob that incumbent a obtains 50% of the votes in the period t elections. It is the probability
that the number of voters times their individual probability Pr to vote for incumbent a (as determined in Equation A.7) is greater
or equal to 12 . However, the individual probability Pr is different for informed and uninformed voters because their expectations of
period t skills, Et[𝜇at ], differ. The probability for the incumbent to win the election – Equation (9) in the main text – is repeated here:
Prob
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩






























forec − (1 + rt−1)(Dt−1) + 𝜇at + 𝜇
a
t−1. (B.2)
For informed voters we obtain:
Einft [𝜇
a







forec + (1 + rt−1)Dt−1 − 𝜇at−1. (B.3)
Additional public goods Gt , previous period deficit Dt−1, previous period skills 𝜇at−1, and interest rate rt−1 can be observed by
everybody. The point is that informed voters can determine Einft [𝜇
a
t ] deterministically, because they can also observe the incumbent’s
revenue forecast, R+t
forec. By contrast, uninformed voters must form an estimate of the incumbent’s skills, 𝜇at , based on their perception













forec + (1 + rt−1)Dt−1 − 𝜇at−1
= G+t − R
+
t








29 Note that they will probably end up with a deficit or surplus though because the actual additional revenue depends on the deviation from trend output, y+t , which
is a random variable. See also the discussion on the timing of events on page 7.
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Uninformed voters overestimate the incumbent’s skills by R+t
forec − ̂R+t
forec. Using Equations (B.3) and (B.4) we can now determine
the probability Probwin that incumbent a receives 50% of the votes in period t:
Probwin ≡ Prob
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ (1 − 𝜓) [
𝜇at
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+ 1 + 𝛾
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forec) − 𝛼𝛾], (B.6)
where F(•) is the distribution function of the skills shock. Equations (B.5) and (B.6) are identical to Equations (10) and (11)in the
main text.
Fig. B.1 Bell-shaped skills density function as an example.
The marked area towards the right (light grey or yellow [if in colour]) under the density function depicted in Fig. B.1 corresponds
to the probability described by Equation (B.5) and by the distribution function representation in Equation (B.6). If the ex ante winning
chances are the same for incumbent and challenger (shift parameter 𝛾 = 0), then the expected skills overall (combine Equations B.3
and B.4) is always greater than the actual skills, if the government’s revenue estimate perceived by uninformed voters is smaller than





forec). Then the probability (see Equation (B.6) or the light grey [or yellow] area
under the density function) is always greater than 12 . An overly optimistic (manipulated) revenue forecast increases the government’s
chance to be re-elected. (A similar effect occurs, if uninformed voters were to reduce their perception of the government revenue
forecast for some reason.) If the ex ante winning changes for incumbent a are larger (𝛾 < 0), the government needs less forecast
manipulation to achieve the same effect.
C. Incumbent’s maximisation problem
Now, we can maximise incumbent a’s utility over the entire election cycle, i.e. periods t and t + 1. Period t + 1 utility is the sum
of the utilities for winning and losing the election weighted by the probability determined in the previous step. A condensed version
of the following equation is also found as Equation (12) in the main text.
max
R+t
forec V = maxR+t











forec − (1 + rt−1)(Dt−1) + 𝜂at
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
G+t (eq. 4)
+ Xt − 𝜉D2t−1
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭
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forec)a − (1 + rt)Dt + 𝜂at+1
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
Gat+1




























Next, substitute in for the expected current debt (Eat [Dt] = R
+
t
forec); simplify expectations when they are zero (expectations of the addi-
tional revenue shocks, Eat [R
+













forec)b] = 0); and acknowledge that the incumbent knows her past, but not her present and future skills, nor the skills shocks
of the challenger (Eat [𝜂
a
























forec ct(y) + ct+1(y) + R+t
forec − (1 + rt−1Dt−1 + 𝜇at−1 + Xt − 𝜉D
2








forec) − 𝛼𝛾]] [Xt+1 − 𝜉(R+t
forec)2]. (C.2)













forec = 0, (C.3)
where F′[•] = f[•] refers to the probability density function. In equilibrium, this becomes rational expectations condition (13) in
the main text which is repeated here:
−rt + F′[−𝛼𝛾]𝜓[Xt+1 − 𝜉(R+t
forec)2] − [1 − F[−𝛼𝛾]]2𝜉R+t
forec = 0, (C.4)
D. Perturbation Results for Propositions
The propositions at the end of Section 2 are obtained by using the Implicit Function Theorem. The derivations of the marginal






















forec − (1 − F[•])2𝜉
< 0. (D.1)
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forec − (1 − F[•])2𝜉




forec) = 0 under rational expectations. (D.3)
E. Descriptive Statistics
Table E.1
Descriptive Statistics for Municipal Revenues, Expenditures and Budget Balance.
Revenue Item Observations Mean St.Deviation Minimum Maximum
Total current revenues 5375 712.67 351.73 213.12 3381.79
Direct taxes 5375 148.66 121.44 5.37 1269.78
Indirect taxes 5375 10.72 19.96 −4.10 356.21
Fees 5375 18.68 19.45 0.00 700.00
Property 5375 26.70 34.93 0.00 621.79
Current transfers 5375 411.33 310.69 56.13 3091.94
Sales of goods and services 5375 87.92 66.15 1.25 691.19
Other current revenues 5375 8.66 15.19 −0.01 322.62
Total capital revenues 5375 384.48 366.68 2.11 7734.82
Sales of capital goods 5375 12.32 36.94 −0.21 1771.44
Capital transfers 5375 289.38 265.42 0.38 5508.58
Financial assets 5375 2.11 28.07 0.00 1308.35
Financial liabilities 5375 78.25 214.93 0.00 7306.46
Other capital revenues 5375 2.42 14.49 −0.11 531.16
Effective capital revenues 5375 304.12 270.29 2.11 5508.58
Total revenues 5375 1097.61 584.11 333.76 8601.38
Total effective revenues 5375 1017.26 519.57 322.19 7899.66
Fiscal revenues 5375 171.80 136.04 8.12 1363.22
Own revenues 5375 318.66 194.81 51.35 2713.21
Total expenditures 5375 1091.35 582.82 305.93 8606.57
Total current expenditures 5375 642.40 342.35 158.90 2925.30
Total capital expenditures 5375 448.95 339.33 46.44 6762.57
Budget balance 5373 −4.81 165.87 −4034.10 855.08
Primary budget balance 5373 12.20 161.31 −3688.69 861.79
Source: Directorate General for Local Authorities (DGAL).
Notes: Revenues, expenditures, and budget balances are measured in real euros per capita (at 2017
national prices). Effective capital revenues correspond to total capital revenuues minus the revenues
from financial assets and liabilities. Total effective revenues are the sum of total current revenues
and effective capital revenues. The budget balance is defined as the difference between total revenues
and expenditures, excluding revenues and expenditures in financial assets and liabilities. The primary
budget balance further excludes interest payments on debt.
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Table E.2
Descriptive Statistics.
VARIABLES Observ. Mean St.Dev. Min. Max.
Forecast error in effective revenues (Forecast − Actual) 5375.00 534.21 566.75 −754.79 7190.87
Forecast error in current revenues (Forecast − Actual) 5375.00 92.32 197.41 −815.34 4366.40
Forecast error in capital revenues (Forecast − Actual) 5375.00 441.80 466.81 −497.03 5208.12
Election year 5375.00 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00
Mayor left (PS, PCP, or BE) 5375.00 0.54 0.50 0.00 1.00
Majority (in the Town Hall and Municipal Assembly) 5375.00 0.81 0.39 0.00 1.00
Win margin (in percentage points) in the previous election 5375.00 19.69 14.01 0.02 75.75
Run for reelection 5375.00 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00
Terms mayor 5375.00 2.37 1.70 0.00 10.00
Same party (mayor and prime minister) 5375.00 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
Unemployment rate 5375.00 6.83 2.81 0.64 18.48
Forecast error in GDP growth (NUTS 3 region) 5375.00 0.18 2.80 −18.17 15.28
Population growth rate 5375.00 −0.28 2.12 −21.56 24.98
Financial autonomy (own revenues as % of effective) 5375.00 35.77 19.10 1.14 124.75
Budget balance 5373.00 −4.81 165.87 −4034.10 855.08
% Population with no education level completed 5375.00 14.23 5.60 2.21 38.23
% Population with less than complete secondary education 5375.00 8.83 3.44 1.79 23.52
% Population with complete secondary education 5375.00 14.13 5.89 0.51 39.13
Sources: Directorate General for Local Authorities (DGAL), Ministry of Internal Affairs (MAI), National Statistics Institute (INE), and
Marktest’s Sales Index database.
Note: Forecast errors in revenues correspond to the difference between forecasted and actual amounts, both measured in real euros
per capita (at 2017 national prices).
Table E.3
Descriptive Statistics for Forecast Errors in Revenues.
Forecast error in Revenue items Election Years Off-election Years
Observ. Mean St.Deviation Observ. Mean St.Deviation
Total current revenues 1464 89.92 187.86 3911 93.21 200.88
Direct taxes 1464 2.63 48.32 3911 2.54 54.04
Indirect taxes 1464 6.96 31.48 3911 5.61 21.56
Fees 1464 5.21 20.45 3911 5.46 20.47
Property income 1464 13.49 54.79 3911 13.72 69.38
Current transfers 1464 19.85 71.83 3911 25.34 83.09
Sales of goods and services 1464 23.57 88.35 3911 23.68 76.10
Other current revenues 1464 18.20 95.11 3911 16.86 90.56
Total capital revenues 1464 451.52 546.33 3911 442.25 493.65
Sales of capital goods 1464 132.33 233.11 3911 124.11 201.97
Capital transfers 1464 316.82 428.61 3911 296.65 380.53
Financial assets 1464 3.43 54.74 3911 4.71 45.61
Financial liabilities 1464 −15.22 265.33 3911 3.80 226.17
Other capital revenues 1464 14.16 76.58 3911 12.99 76.14
Effective capital revenues 1464 463.31 510.56 3911 433.75 449.14
Total revenues 1464 541.32 619.48 3911 535.63 589.90
Total effective revenues 1464 553.10 601.32 3911 527.13 553.16
Fiscal revenues 1464 4.79 68.18 3911 7.25 64.72
Own revenues 1464 219.67 337.61 3911 209.52 318.32
Source: Directorate General for Local Authorities (DGAL).
Notes: Forecast errors in revenues correpond to the difference between forecasted and actual amounts, both measured in
real euros per capita (at 2017 national prices). Effective capital revenues correspond to total capital revenues minus the
revenues from financial assets and liabilities. Total effective revenues are the sum of total current revenues and effective
capital revenues.
20
F. Bohn and F.J. Veiga European Journal of Political Economy 66 (2021) 101934
Table E.4
Expenditures and Budget Balances in Election and Off-election Years.
Election Years Off-election Years
Observ. Mean St.Deviation Observ. Mean St.Deviation
Total expenditures 1464 1151.73 602.00 3911 1068.74 573.92
Total effective expenditures 1464 1076.19 546.37 3909 1001.19 529.64
Current expenditures 1464 677.15 354.92 3911 629.39 336.65
Capital expenditures 1464 474.57 357.20 3911 439.36 331.93
Effective capital expenditures 1464 399.04 294.54 3909 371.75 292.13
Budget balance 1464 −34.63 167.08 3909 6.35 164.05
Primary budget balance 1464 −17.41 162.45 3909 23.29 159.49
Source: Directorate General for Local Authorities (DGAL).
Notes: Expenditures and budget balances are measured in real euros per capita (at 2017 national prices). Effective
expenditures exclude financial assets and liabilities. The budget balance is defined as the difference between total
effective revenues and total effective expenditures, that is, it excludes revenues and expenditures in financial assets
and liabilities. The primary budget balance further excludes interest payments on debt.
F. Robustness Tests
This subsection presents the results of several robustness tests.
Table F.1
PBCs in effective revenue forecasts (using 3 election dummies).
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)



























































































Observations 5375 5375 5375
Municipalities 308 308 308
Adjusted R-squared 0.19 0.09 0.21
Notes: Fixed effects regressions with standard errors clustered by municipality and robust to heteroskedasticity. The dependent
variable is the forecast error (forecast - actual) in effective revenues, in real euros per capita. All estimations include 4-year
mandate dummies. T-statistics are in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10.
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Table F.2
Robustness tests - baseline results with year dummies.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)









































































































































































(continued on next page)
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Table F.2 (continued)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
Total Revenues Current Revenues Capital Revenues


















Observations 5375 5375 5375
Municipalities 308 308 308
Adjusted R-squared 0.22 0.11 0.23
Averages of the coefficients for the year dummies
























Differences between the averages


















Notes: Fixed effects regressions with standard errors clustered by municipality and robust to heteroskedasticity. The dependent
variable is the forecast error (forecast - actual) in effective revenues, in real euros per capita. T-statistics are in parentheses.












Robustness tests - alternative definitions of the dependent variable.
VARIABLES Percentage Forecast Errors Difference to 4-year average revenues
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

























































































































Observations 5274 5274 5274 5369 5369 5369
Municipalities 308 308 308 308 308 308
Notes: Fixed effects regressions with standard errors clustered by municipality and robust to heteroskedasticity. The dependent variable is defined as indicated in the first row (always based on effective












Robustness tests - restricted samples.
VARIABLES Excluding Azores and Madeira Excluding Term-Limited Mayors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

























































































































Observations 4985 4985 4985 4449 4449 4449
Municipalities 278 278 278 308 308 308
Notes: Fixed effects regressions with standard errors clustered by municipality and robust to heteroskedasticity. The dependent variable is the forecast error (forecast - actual) in effective revenues, in real euros












Robustness tests - joint test of the three propositions.
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





















































































Observations 5375 5375 5375 5375 5375 5375
Municipalities 308 308 308 308 308 308
Adjusted R-squared 0.20 0.09 0.21 0.18 0.09 0.20
Notes: Fixed effects regressions with standard errors clustered by municipality and robust to heteroskedasticity. The dependent variable is the forecast error (forecast - actual) in effective revenues, in real euros per
capita. All regressions include the full set of control variables used in Table 2. T-statistics are in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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Table F.6
Results for expenditures and the budget balance.



































































































































Observations 5375 5375 5375 5373 5373
Municipalities 308 308 308 308 308
Adjusted R-squared 0.15 0.58 0.10 0.10 0.10
Notes: Fixed effects regressions with standard errors clustered by municipality and robust to heteroskedasticity. The dependent variables are indicated in
the column titles, and are measured in real euros per capita. All regressions include 4-year mandate dummies. T-statistics are in parentheses. ∗∗∗p < 0.01,
∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1.
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